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 INTRODUCTION 
Jo Shaw’s magnificent book, The People in Question: Citizens and Constitutions 
in Uncertain Times, focuses primarily on what she calls the ‘constitutional 
citizen’.1 The stateless individual, defined under international law as ‘a person 
who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’,2 
is therefore potentially at the periphery of her book. Shaw acknowledges this early 
on, referring evocatively to the ‘shadow of statelessness’3 and noting that ‘[t]he 
shadowy presence of the non-citizen lurks throughout the book, without being the 
central focus of analysis’.4 Yet, despite the focus on constitutional citizens, there 
is still plenty of thought-provoking material relevant in some way to the plight of 
non-citizens. In particular, the breadth and depth of Shaw’s analysis prompts 
reflection on the phenomenon of statelessness. 
The inherent nature of statelessness means that it is difficult to be accurate 
about the extent of the problem. The most recent estimate from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) of the number of stateless persons 
was 4.2 million,5 but the true extent of statelessness is estimated to be much higher 
with at least 15 million stateless people globally.6 Significant populations of 
stateless persons include Rohingya in Myanmar and displaced in neighbouring 
countries, Palestinians, Bidun and Kurds in the Middle East, Roma in Europe, 
individuals from the former Soviet Bloc and those of Haitian descent in the 
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Dominican Republic.7 An emerging situation of potential mass statelessness is the 
Muslim minority in the state of Assam in India.8 Causes of statelessness include 
racial and religious discrimination, armed conflict, gender discriminatory 
nationality laws, arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, state succession, lack of birth 
registration and inter-generational statelessness. The consequences of 
statelessness can include deportation, forced displacement, trafficking, inability to 
access government-funded services such as health and education, and an inability 
to own property, get government jobs, or work in certain professions.9 Or, to put 
it within a constitutional citizenship framework, statelessness means a lack of 
membership in a political community and a consequent lack of equality before the 
law. As famously described by Hannah Arendt, it is the absence of the ‘right to 
have rights’.10 
This review offers three observations on Shaw’s work and its linkages to the 
problem of statelessness. The first observation concerns the ways in which 
constitutions currently regulate (or do not regulate) those who are stateless. The 
second is on the pivotal impact of discrimination (racial, religious and gender) on 
both citizenship and statelessness. Finally, and more optimistically, this review 
considers whether the fragmented nature of citizenship governance identified by 
Shaw may open discursive spaces for progress on statelessness as well as 
citizenship. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF STATELESSNESS 
Shaw points out that detailed constitutional regulation of citizenship is relatively 
rare,11 despite it being such a significant element of a constitutional framework. 
The lack of constitutional regulation is also true — even more so — for stateless 
persons. Around 30 constitutions mention statelessness or stateless persons in 
some way.12 These references typically fall into one of four categories.13 Some 
constitutions provide that citizenship will be granted if someone would otherwise 
be stateless, or that there will be no deprivation of citizenship if the consequence 
would be to leave a person stateless. This type of provision aimed at preventing 
statelessness, and reflecting the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
(‘1961 Convention’),14 arises especially in regions of the world that are post-
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conflict or post-transition.15 Other provisions provide that the rights and freedoms 
of citizens are also available to stateless persons. Contrastingly, sometimes there 
are constitutional exclusions from rights protections for those who are stateless, 
including limits on political rights and the ability to own property. The fourth type 
of reference is to stateless persons being able to seek asylum or receive protection 
from expulsion or deportation alongside refugees and asylum seekers. 
Although it is surprising that constitutional references to citizenship are 
relatively light given the importance of ‘the people’ to the constitutional 
enterprise, the lack of explicit reference to stateless people is less unexpected. 
Almost by definition, stateless people are not ‘the people’ with whom a 
constitution is intimately connected; ‘the people in question’ are not those who are 
stateless. Equally, no state makes creating statelessness into a constitutional 
objective, although as Shaw notes, it can readily become the core by-product of 
‘constitutional exclusivity’.16 In this sense, the fact that over 30 constitutions refer 
to stateless persons, and many in an inclusionary rather than an exclusionary 
manner, seems promising.  
Having said that, the potential implications for stateless people in those states 
where the constitution is silent on their status are significant. Where the 
constitution is protective of those who are stateless, either by according citizenship 
or access to rights, then this provides a constitutional bulwark. If there is no 
constitutional reference to those who are stateless, then their plight is left to the 
whim of politicians, judges or bureaucrats of the day. As Shaw notes, even in those 
constitutions that make comprehensive reference to citizenship, much of the detail 
of citizenship regulation is often determined by the legislature.17 In the current 
environment, the perils of a populist legislature are a particular risk, with tyranny 
of the majority a very real prospect. Equally, administrative, procedural and 
bureaucratic measures can have a profound negative impact and result in 
precarious outcomes for those who are stateless. While explicit constitutional 
reference to those who are stateless may therefore be useful, this can still be 
undermined on the ground by political, judicial, administrative and bureaucratic 
actions. As Julija Sardelić notes in her comment, the dynamic of constitutional 
citizenship can work to enhance equality and dignity of all human beings 
(including those who are stateless), but it can also undermine it.18 
 DISCRIMINATION AND ITS IMPACTS 
The second observation prompted by Shaw’s book is the profound impact of 
discrimination — racial, religious and gender in particular — on both citizenship 
and statelessness. As Shaw points out, states have been manipulating citizenship 
in ‘the national interest’ for as long as it has existed as a constitutional 
phenomenon, with almost every instance of decolonisation involving an element 
of ‘engineering’ of citizenship, often based on problematic ‘ethnic’ choices.19 
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Many of the intractable statelessness situations arise in the context of 
entrenched discrimination — especially against ethnic minorities.20 The 
application of racially defined preferences, plus other ethnically based restrictions, 
has produced large populations of stateless or marginalised people.21 Notable 
examples are the Rohingya in Myanmar, and Haitians in the Dominican Republic. 
As pointed out by Kriszta Kovács in her comment, even where citizenship 
practices are externally-focused and concerned with widening the citizenship 
catchment, for ethnonational populists, ethnicity is the key factor for non-
residential citizenship.22 Unfortunately, given the huge deference to state 
sovereignty in the area of nationality and citizenship, explicit and overt racial 
discrimination is tolerated and sometimes even condoned. A good example of this 
can be found in art 1(2) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which provides that the Convention ‘shall not 
apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party 
to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens’.23 This hands-off approach 
at the international level has historically enabled states to act with impunity when 
it comes to both citizenship and statelessness.  
This impunity can currently be observed with the populist Indian Government 
of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in the 
Indian state of Assam, where discrimination on various grounds including 
religion, ethnicity and language linked to the rebuilding of the National Register 
of Citizens (‘NRC’) has been ongoing for some years.24 Up to two million people 
were left off the August 2019 draft of the NRC in Assam, including many from 
the Muslim minority. This raises the prospect of detention, deportation to 
Bangladesh and statelessness. An amendment to the citizenship legislation in 
December 2019 has improved the prospects of citizenship registration for many 
of these two million, but not for those who are Muslim.25 
Gender discrimination in the context of both citizenship and statelessness is in 
some ways a less entrenched area of discrimination than race or religion. Gender 
discriminatory nationality laws that prevent mothers from passing on their 
nationality to their children are a key cause of childhood statelessness and inter-
generational statelessness. Although some problematic situations remain,26 gender 
discriminatory nationality laws have ‘toppled like dominoes around the globe’ in 
recent years.27 There are now only 25 countries that still deny women the right to 
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confer their nationality on their children on an equal basis with men.28 Illustrating 
the positive impact of international efforts, key milestones in helping to overturn 
gender discriminatory nationality laws have been the adoption of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979,29 and 
the launch of the Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights in 2014.30 At the 
national level, constitutional amendment has become a central part of the toolkit 
of gender equality, but as Shaw notes, ‘constitutions globally hold a more 
consistent baseline in relation to the inclusion of equality as a principle than they 
do in relation to citizenship’.31 The prospects for reform of constitutional (and 
legislative) provisions on citizenship, nationality and statelessness, remain dogged 
by the spectre of state sovereignty. 
 FRAGMENTED CITIZENSHIP GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A key paradox identified by Shaw is that alongside the rise of populism, many 
dimensions of globalisation still continue to flourish.32 In particular, Shaw argues 
that there has been a reconfiguration or transformation of the character of 
citizenship with new norms emerging at the subnational, national, regional and 
international levels, such that there is now multilevel governance of citizenship.33 
An exciting prospect is that this fragmentation of governance might therefore open 
up discursive spaces for contesting citizenship with the result that states’ absolute 
sovereignty in citizenship matters may be eroded. This third observation considers 
what this fragmentation might mean for the problem of statelessness. 
An important aspect of this emerging multilevel governance is that 
international norms relating to citizenship are evolving.34 Shaw points out that 
questions of citizenship have not typically been prominent in the context of either 
international development work or international human rights promotion.35 In 
some ways, this is in contrast to the issue of statelessness, which has received more 
international attention — illustrated in the aftermath of World War Two with the 
adoption of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 
the 1961 Convention,36 admittedly then followed by a period of lack of 
international visibility, but now more firmly on the international agenda with the 
UNHCR mandate for stateless persons, the Global Action Plan to End 
Statelessness 2014−2024 and UNHCR’s #IBelong campaign.37 However, one of 
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the challenges for the continued international visibility of statelessness is framing 
it as a human rights issue.38  
Increased international interest in and scrutiny of citizenship as a human rights 
issue is therefore likely to be beneficial for addressing statelessness. Scholars have 
argued for a rights-based approach to citizenship which may perhaps lead to an  
international law of citizenship or even an international right to citizenship.39 Of 
particular interest here for those who are stateless is the idea of a ius nexi route to 
citizenship which recognises the proximity or connectedness of a person to a 
polity,40 or a genuine and effective link.41 Encouraging developments addressing 
both citizenship and statelessness in rights terms include regional human rights 
decisions in Africa, the Americas and Europe.42 
However, even though there is a discernible move away from citizenship as 
being solely within the regulatory domain of states, what does a ‘global 
governance’ approach have to offer? Shaw notes that the case is currently not very 
strong for arguing that there is an emergent ‘constitutionalised’ framing of 
citizenship practices at the global level as a result of the effects of international 
law or a decisive ‘global’ reframing of constitutional citizenship.43 But, have 
international norms on citizenship ‘leaked in’ (using Shaw’s colourful term) to 
national constitutions?44 On the one hand, it is clear that the current Westphalian 
system of state sovereignty in relation to membership is not going to collapse any 
time soon. On the other, the interest of the international community in 
constitutional law and citizenship practices is strengthening and being expressed 
in innovative and creative ways. A good example of this is the attempt earlier this 
year by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to intervene in 
Supreme Court proceedings in India on the citizenship registration process in 
Assam.45 More of this type of intervention will assist in international norms 
shaping and strengthening national constitutional frameworks — to the benefit of 
both citizenship and statelessness. 
 CONCLUSION 
Shaw observes that ‘citizenship is always likely to disappoint those who invest in 
it the hopes that it will deliver equality and inclusion’.46 In her contribution, 
Johanna Hase also observes that Shaw’s notion of constitutional citizenship has 
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its own conceptual and empirical limits.47 While there is certainly a healthy dose 
of realism in both these observations, for those who are stateless, what 
constitutional citizenship and citizenship more broadly do at least offer is a chance 
to emerge from the shadows. Pursuit of more inclusive constitutions, laws and 
citizenship practices that enable those who are stateless to belong to ‘the people in 
question’ is therefore an important goal. Shaw’s book offers much food for 
thought for such endeavours.  
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